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This opinion piece offers insights into the geopolitics of the ongoing global energy transition. In doing so, 
it draws heavily on a workshop in Berlin in late 2018, and a subsequent paper in the journal Nature. Four 
scenarios are presented. First, the “Big Green Deal” offers a positive story of the future, under the 
assumption that there will be a multilateral approach to tackling climate change. Second, “Dirty 
Nationalism” explores the fallout of nations choosing to turn inward and pursue a short-term, 
protectionist and self-interested agenda. Third, “Technology Breakthrough” illustrates how a 
technological leap forward could lead to a great power rivalry and distinct regional energy blocs. Finally, 
“Muddling On” investigates the outcome of an energy transition that reflect business as usual. By 
comparing and contrasting the different scenarios, the article highlights the potential winners and losers 
of the different scenarios, and the geopolitical consequences. It also sketches the implications for policy, 
theory, and scenario thinking more broadly. 
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Abstract 
This opinion piece offers insights into the geopolitics of the ongoing global energy transition. In doing so, 
it draws heavily on a workshop in Berlin in late 2018, and a subsequent paper in the journal Nature. Four 
scenarios are presented. First, the “Big Green Deal” offers a positive story of the future, under the 
assumption that there will be a multilateral approach to tackling climate change. Second, “Dirty 
Nationalism” explores the fallout of nations choosing to turn inward and pursue a short-term, 
protectionist and self-interested agenda. Third, “Technology Breakthrough” illustrates how a 
technological leap forward could lead to a great power rivalry and distinct regional energy blocs. Finally, 
“Muddling On” investigates the outcome of an energy transition that reflect business as usual. By 
comparing and contrasting the different scenarios, the article highlights the potential winners and losers 
of the different scenarios, and the geopolitical consequences. It also sketches the implications for policy, 
theory, and scenario thinking more broadly. 
 
1 Introduction 
Climate policies are gaining traction amongst voters, investors and businesses (Jackson and Boyon 2019). 
Grassroots movements such as Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion, have gone global within a few 
months. Witness the global climate strike on 20 September, 2019. Sovereign wealth funds, institutional 
endowments, pension and investment funds and insurance companies have started to move out of coal 
assets (Ralph 2019), and some are leaving oil and gas too. In the 2019 EU parliamentary elections climate 
change became a make or break topic for winning majorities at the ballot box. The 2019 UN Climate 
Summit drew global attention from civil society. Indeed, the recent IPCC report on ‘Global Warming of 
1.5o C drives home the point that the world needs to move urgently to a low-carbon economy (IPCC 2018) 
.  
Going low carbon, however, comes with challenges. A recent report by the International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA 2019) suggests that an energy transformation driven by renewables could have 
severe geopolitical implications. The authors fear new tensions, for instance between China and the U.S., 
as both seek global dominance in the strategically important clean tech sector and control of the raw 
materials required for their production (see also (O’Sullivan, Overland, and Sandalow 2017). Beijing’s 
recent threats to curb the export of rare earths are a testimony to that (Hornby and Sanderson 2019). 
New global alliances have been formed around specific renewable technologies that challenge the 
incumbent institutional architecture governing global energy, including OPEC(the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries), which may to radically change its composition and purpose or become 
irrelevant.  
Thanks to renewable energy supply generated at home, fossil fuel importers may gain the upper hand 
over their suppliers (Scholten and Bosman 2016). It has therefore been suggested that traditional oil 
exporters, for instance in the Middle East, are likely among the potential losers of this transition (van de 
Graaf and Bradshaw 2018). To be sure, not all oil producers will be equally affected (Goldthau and 
Westphal 2019). But according to calculations by the IEA, oil prices could settle in a $60-70 a barrel range 
if the world embarks on a low carbon pathway, leading to trillions of dollars of lost revenue for oil and gas 
producer economies over the next two decades (IEA 2018). 
This opinion piece adds to the emerging discussion on the geopolitics of the energy transition by 
challenging the linearity that (implicitly or explicitly) underpins existing contributions. Instead of focusing 
on an ‘end stage’ in line with the UNFCC 2050-time line, we consciously picked the energy systems and 
the geopolitics of today as our starting point and developed “theories of the future” to 2030. This reflects 
the fact that the energy system is a long-term sector—with investments having to pay-off over decades—
and that decisions made in the 2020s need to set it on the right path to peak global emissions by the end 
of the decade and then enable rapid reductions to achieve 2050 targets. Furthermore, we wanted to 
explore alternative energy transition pathways, their potential ramifications and path dependencies, as 
well as the opportunities that may emerge in the long run. This has important policy implications, but also 
challenges theory and prevalent approaches to scenario thinking in the energy and climate space. 
2 Why scenarios 
Scenarios are tools for thinking about plausible and internally-consistent alternative pathways (Snoek 
2003). Scenario planning is now widely recognized as a method for dealing with high levels of uncertainly 
when determining future business strategies and government policies. In the energy sector the thinking 
of Pierre Wack (1985) and subsequent development of the ‘Shell Scenarios’ (Bentham 2014) are seen as 
the trailblazers in the field. In recent years more companies, DNVL, BP and Equninor for example, have 
begun to engage in scenario planning to help them chart the potential impact of climate change policies 
on fossil fuel demand. In parallel, scenarios now play a critical role in the annual publication of the 
International Energy Agency, the World Energy Outlook. Finally, scenarios are central to research on 
climate change, for example, the IPCC’s recent I.5 Degrees report (IPCC 2018)  generated a number of 
scenarios charting various emissions pathways.  
Scenarios deal with questions of structural, instead of incremental, change, though they often include a 
business as usual (BAU) pathway. Furthermore, scenarios are tools for thinking about plausible and 
consistent alternative pathways. We understand scenarios as comprehensive pictures and narratives of 
the future (Gabriel 2014). Moreover, scenarios are a description of possible futures that depict a point in 
time, as well as an exemplary chain of events leading to this situation (Bishop, Hines, and Collins 2007). 
Hence, scenarios create a space for thinking about what is possible. Comparing the similarities and 
differences between the scenarios allows a better understanding of the key sensitivities and drivers 
underlying the subject at hand, as well as the key factors that might dictate the pace of change.  
Below, we present four scenarios for the global energy transformation2 in 2030 (GET2030), each of which 
results in a different end stage and entails its own logics.3  
 
2 We use the term of transition to describe the narrower focus on the energy system, as opposed to a wider socio-
economic and political transformation process. 
3 These scenarios rest on a series of structured scenario workshops that brought together an interdisciplinary 
group of international experts, held in Berlin in the fall of 2018. This opinion also draws from an article jointly 
published by the present authors in Nature (Goldthau, Westphal, Bazilian and Bradshaw 2019).  
 
3 Four plausible energy pathways 
Each of the four scenarios rests on a distinct key driver of change, with consequences for the pace of 
change, the international political architecture underpinning the trajectory, the shape of the resulting 
energy landscape and the consequences for the climate change mitigation (the implications for the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals were also considered as part of the wider policy landscape). 
3.1 Concerted policy drive: “Big Green Deal” 
An energy transition driven by a global consensus on the urgent need for action sets in motion a 
cooperative dynamic. It also implies a rapid and deep decarbonization and a steady ‘ratcheting up’ of 
ambition within the Paris Agreement. Thanks to clear, determined and concerted policy signals, financial 
markets heed the call, and divestment from fossil assets quickly gains momentum. As a corollary, 
companies specializing in low carbon technologies are strongly capitalized, and within a relatively short 
period of time, green technology corporations supplant big oil on stock markets, though some 
international oil companies succeed in reinventing themselves. A comprehensive green finance package 
gives petro-states in the Middle East a soft landing, enabling them to eventually manage the loss of fossil-
fuel rents and leave the carbon-intensive economic model of old.  
This “Big Green Deal” scenario represents the ideal case, comprehensively putting the world economy on 
the path from a high to a low carbon paradigm whilst bringing about significant growth and welfare effects 
in line with the Sustainable Development Goals. This is the only scenario that achieves the SDGs. 
Underpinned by a multilateral approach, the potential for energy related international and regional 
conflicts decreases significantly While it is underpinned by a multilateral approach, the potential for 
conflict remains, but energy security concerns are no longer paramount reducing the potential for 
international and regional conflict. 
3.2 Zero-sum Anarchy: “Dirty Nationalism” 
The opposite dynamic emerges in this case where the primary driver is nationalism. Inward-looking 
policies favour self-interest and autarchy over interdependence and cooperation. This in part helps the 
development of renewables as they are seen as domestic energy sources replacing imported ones, thus 
reducing vulnerability (defined as import dependence). But it primarily helps fossil fuels if available, 
notably coal, as well as unconventional fossil fuels such as tight oil and gas. Importantly, as national 
governments seek their own solutions to what is a global problem, global markets fragment, thus 
prohibiting the scale economies that are needed to drive down costs and help deploy novel low-carbon 
technologies at scale. The divestment campaign loses momentum in the face of renewed state subsidy of 
domestic fossil fuels, which also undermines the prospects for investments in green technologies.  
National energy security trumps concerns about climate change.  Moreover, as states favour conflict over 
cooperation, multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UNFCCC 
become side-lined or abandoned. This results in a failure of the Paris Agreement, and the NDC mechanism 
committing countries to reduce CO2 emissions. It also undermines support for the Sustainable 
Development Goals. 
In this scenario, change is slow, if not stalling, a focus on national self-interest is the dominant model (in 
keeping with realist theories of international relations), with an emphasis on power politics centred on 
the nation-state making the political architecture fragmented, while climate change remains unabated 
and an increasing ‘threat escalator’ that brings about climate-induced conflict. Fossil fuel producers, albeit 
under pressure, continue with their existing business model. 
3.3 Hegemony and Disruption: “Technology Breakthrough”  
Let us assume, by way of contrast, a technology breakthrough in, say, electricity storage and high-voltage 
direct current lines, plus continued cost reductions for solar and wind generation technologies. Their 
sizeable markets, coupled with a technology-friendly regulatory environment puts China and the U.S. in 
the lead in scaling up the production, deployment and trade of critical technologies. The resulting 
competition is not only about technology leadership, with tech giants such as State Grid of China and 
Google vying for market share. It also extends to geopolitical rivalry, which is reinforced and cements 
regional blocs – now defined in large part by their respective integrated energy systems (transnational 
electricity grids). These blocs end up in conflict over critical materials needed for low carbon tech. Whilst 
such a ‘Tech Breakthrough’ scenario helps to mitigate climate change; some regions lose out. As market 
scale and might matter most in technology leadership, Europe, for instance, ends up being marginalized. 
Russia, having failed to diversify its economy, faces falling government revenues from oil and gas, the 
decline of its national champions, Gazprom and Rosneft and growing social unrest.  
There is, of course, a potential alternative pathway whereby technological advances in Carbon Capture 
and Storage (CCS) and negative emissions enable a significant amount of fossil fuel production to remain 
in the mix, however, the falling cost of low carbon technologies and their relative abundance and absence 
of other environmental externalities means that they still win out. Equally, biomass energy and CCS is 
preferred to using that technology to retain fossil fuels, though the scale of deployment is limited by 
concerns over biodiversity and food security.  
In this scenario, change is fast (though not as fast the “Big Green Deal”) but uneven, the political 
architecture is regional hegemony. This scenario demonstrates a pathway that is politically and socially 
problematic, but one that does resolve the climate change challenge. 
3.4 Business as usual: “Muddling on” 
Finally, the ‘Muddling On’ path reflects a BAU scenario, which is a traditional requirement of scenario 
planning, whereby prolonged linear cost reduction for renewables is the major driver of climate change 
mitigation. Consequently, renewables claim an increasing share of the energy mix. However, the speed of 
the energy transition is too slow to mitigate global climate change, but still too fast for most of the 
incumbent fossil fuel industry to adapt successfully. This results not only in a series of bankruptcies of 
National Oil Companies, but also in many of their private international counterparts facing significant 
financial stress. In addition, fossil-fuel exports to the EU soon become a risky business model, putting 
severe financial pressure on oil producer economies in the Middle East, Russia and Africa, some of which 
may experience domestic political turmoil as a result. Moreover, China’s motivation for transforming their 
energy system lies in improving air and water quality and in building sizeable state champions fit for the 
global market. Europe, by contrast, is more concerned with climate change, pushing bilateral low carbon 
energy partnerships. The U.S. remains on standby, focused on domestic matters. This implies diverse 
growth models for energy technologies, an increasingly heterogeneous world of “clubs” led by the EU and 
China, and limited global cooperation. As some regions remain characterized by inadequate regulation or 
fail to benefit from select partnerships, this scenario also reinforces existing economic and geopolitical 
imbalances, and increasing energy inequality. This serves to undermine progress on the Sustainable 
Development Goals. 
In this scenario, change is slow, the political architecture is clubs, and climate mitigation is too slow to 
meet climate targets. This highlights that even “Muddling On” is not really business as usual as the growing 
environmental consequences of climate change challenge the status quo.   
Table 1 summarizes the main findings of the four scenarios on the basis of the key dimensions. 
Table 1: Drivers, and consequences of the four scenarios 
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4 Implications for policy, analysis and methodology 
A key takeaway from the scenarios is that the low carbon shift will change energy geopolitics. Yet, at the 
same time, (geo)politics may well drive the pace of energy transition and its specific trajectory. The share 
of renewables at 2030 varies significantly, depending on the pathway and driver underpinning a given 
scenario. So, do the carbon consequences, which range from a new green growth model to unmitigated 
climate change acting as a stress amplifier. This has important implications for policy, analysis and scenario 
thinking more broadly. 
4.1 Policy: focus on pathways not the endgame 
In terms of policy, the scenarios offer several important insights. First, the geopolitics of the low carbon 
transition essentially changes what states are fighting about. In a high-carbon world, the race for what’s 
left continues to centre on fossil fuels. In a low carbon world, with binding emission constraints, it is about 
the remaining global carbon budget. As a corollary, the game shifts from control over resources to control 
over clean tech. A low carbon world may therefore be not necessarily less conflictual than one dominated 
by fossil fuels: a multilaterally-driven decarbonisation scenario gives hope for a better future; a 
technology-driven one may well end up in fierce geoeconomic battles between rivalling tech blocs, where 
electrons increasingly replace molecules in concerns about energy security.  
Second, the pathways towards a low carbon future may be messy. Even if they result in a decarbonized 
world, they are not always overly positive in terms of their side effects. For instance, the continuous but 
slow and uneven progress characterizing the “Muddling On” scenario still means that petrostates struggle 
to adapt to falling global oil demand, and become a source of geopolitical instability (van de Graaf and 
Bradshaw 2018). Another problem is that the transformation dividends are unequally distributed 
(Goldthau, Keim, and Westphal 2018). The breakthrough scenario, for instance, results in only slow 
technology diffusion beyond the hegemonic power blocs of the U.S. and China, a function of their geo-
technological rivalry. 
Third, not all possible paths to a low-carbon endpoint are politically feasible in Western settings. As the 
tech breakthrough scenario suggests, a heavy state-hand, authoritarian rule and regional hegemony is 
just as likely to generate a breakthrough in low carbon technology as a democratic, liberal, market-
oriented approach. This throws up a normative trade-off between the policy goals of an even deployment 
of renewable energy technology and fast and rigid climate change mitigation. The former may well be 
achieved in incumbent multilateral settings, the latter potentially in a world where few powerful countries 
control renewable energy technologies. The IRENA report, is a political document that focuses on the 
potential benefits of a future dominated by renewable energy, and it remains silent on the potential 
geopolical tensions of different pathways to a low(er) carbon future. 
Finally, renewables dominating the global energy system is only one possible endpoint of the transition. 
In fact, the scenario process came out with only one scenario resulting in a win-win for geopolitics and 
the climate – which, coincidently, comes closest to the transformation IRENA depicts in their report. Yet 
there exist alternative trajectories leading to possibly less desirable states of transformation. For instance, 
a nation-first scenario keeps fossils firmly in the mix, as does a BAU scenario. Both are no less likely than 
a “Big Green Deal”. This suggests that policy should likewise focus on the decarbonization path and on the 
desired end result.  
4.2 Analysis: it depends which world you live in 
The conceptual implications of the scenarios are striking when viewed against the incumbent climate 
change regime. Though the “Big Green Deal” and the “Dirty Nationalism” scenarios are both driven by 
politics, their implications are fundamentally different. The former scenario lives in a Kantian world 
underpinned by a liberal paradigm in International Political Economy (IPE), where the mode of politics is 
cooperative and rational actors aim for win-win situations. The result is a joint push for a Pareto-optimal 
outcome – green globalization. The latter scenario, by contrast, is deeply rooted in the realist school of 
thought, that is the Hobbesian idea of an anarchic international system in which states play zero-sum 
games. International cooperation is not ruled out per se, but the ontology underpinning the “Dirty 
Nationalism” scenarios injects a great potential of hard conflict. Though the “Tech Breakthrough” scenario 
delivers on climate change, it also falls into the realist school in IPE. Because low carbon technology 
becomes a source of economic power, strategic trade policies and protectionist measures prevail, to the 
detriment of global solutions. More geoeconomic than geopolitical in nature, technology becomes a proxy 
for ‘war by other means’ (Blackwill and Harris 2016). “Muddling On”, finally, subscribes to the notions of 
interdependence and market drivers, which in conjunction with domestic political imperatives shape the 
international political architecture. While rooted in liberal IPE in principle, the outcome is clubs forming 
around socio-technical and socio-regulatory systems. This scenario highlights the limits of market forces 
and technology progress in bringing about effective global regimes to generate global public goods. Even 
access and diffusion of renewable technologies require a supportive financial and governance architecture 
as evinced in the “Big Green Deal” scenario. 
The findings therefore highlight the importance of the principle paradigm underpinning the global energy 
transition. The present UN-centred approach to climate change mitigation, essentially subscribing to a 
liberal IPE model, will need to be seen in light of the above scenarios. 
4.3 Scenario thinking: look at 2030 not beyond 
The scenarios also offer some methodological lessons. In the energy and climate sphere there is a 
tendency to build scenarios over a long time period, with 2050 as a critical mid-point and 2100 the end 
point. This is because the energy system involves long-term, large-scale, capital intensive projects. For 
example, a decision to invest $30-40 billion today in a plant to produce liquefied natural gas will operate 
for 40 years. The policy time frame for climate change mitigation also tends to focus on long-term targets. 
This provides plenty of time for a wide range of possible outcomes and scenarios to be considered. Many 
models also assume a carbon-neutral endpoint and develop target-driven scenarios. It also enables 
political commitments to be made without fear of being held to account if they are not delivered. 
Contrasting this, the time frame in the present scenarios was to 2030, which proved to be particularly 
challenging when it came to considering the rate of technological change that was plausible over a period 
of little more than a decade. Moreover, it is clear that by 2030 global carbon emissions must peak and the 
global energy system must be on a path to deep decarbonization and global GHG emissions must be 
peaking if it is be on the trajectory to constrain global warming to less than two agrees by the end of the 
Century. Finally, the scenarios presented above questioned the assumption of carbon-neutrality. A key 
methodological lesson, therefore, is to put more emphasis on developing robust mid- to short-range 
scenarios, notably in the context of the global energy transition. This is not only because everything that 
happens in the long run – in the case of the energy transition after 2030 – is a source of ‘radical 
uncertainty’ (Bentham 2014). It is also because it is imperative to consider a range of possible ‘future 
histories’ for effective policy planning to anticipate potential unintended consequences, opportunities 
and threats.  
5 Conclusions 
The gap between our policy ambitions in relation to emissions reduction, and the pathway that we need 
to be on is widening and deepening. It is a relatively easy task to model a world in which the global energy 
system is transformed and the worst impacts of climate change are avoided. The real challenge lies in the 
process of the transition. In short, (geo)politics matter. This scenario exercise has highlighted that the 
road to net-zero is fraught with geopolitical dangers that threaten to de-rail progress and create new 
sources of conflict and inequity. It is only by asking the difficult questions, identifying the possible threats 
to a successful energy transition and presenting a set of possible solutions that we can close the gap in 
our climate ambitions and set us on the road to a just transition. A failure to consider and prepare for the 
geopolitical challenges and tensions that arise from the process of transformation may make it more 
difficult to maintain a path towards deep decarbonization.   
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